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Abstract
This paper presents a rst attempt to measure inequality aversion
among gypsies. We conducted an experiment among adult gypsies liv-
ing at slums outside Vallecas (Madrid). To analyze this variable we use
the mechanism provided by Kroll & Davidovitz (2003) among 38 volun-
tary participants. Results indicate that: i) 52.6% of the individuals are
inequality averse; ii) there is a positive relationship between inequality
aversion and some features of the population such as individual religious
practise, marital status, family size, position in the hierarchy of the family
or club association and, iii) neither wealth, nor participation in voluntary
activities a¤ect inequality aversion.
Keywords: inequality aversion, gypsies, eld experiment.
JEL Class.: C93, D85, Z13
1 Motivation
Gypsies are one of the highest minorities in Spain, approximately 600 thousand
(around 1.5% of the total Spanish population), and its life has been marked
by persecution, discrimination and social exclusion. Although gypsies have
achieved full status as citizens and there have been improvements in their access
to education, housing and so on, they still su¤er from segregation and marginal-
ization, specially in the slums built, often by public initiative, on the outskirts
of many Spanish cities (see Gay Blasco (1999)).
Special thanks to our advisor, Pablo Brañas-Garza for his helpful and crucial comments
and his invaluable support. We also thank Jordi Brandts and Giovanni Ponti for their sug-
gesstions and UCSB for his hospitality in the last phase of this paper. Both authors acknowl-
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Gypsies appear on the top of most negative indices such as lack of vaccina-
tion, accident rate or prison but they do not appear in positive indices such as
economic, educative or political development.
Research about economic behavior of Spanish gypsies is still reduced. A
large number of papers such as Gamella (2005), Gay Blasco (1999) and Sanchez
Ortega (1986) among others have described gypsieshistory, social context or
patterns of behavior. Although, as far we know, only Brañas-Garza, Cobo-
Reyes and Domínguez (2006) (BCD hereafter) have studied this population
using economic methods. Specically, BCD analyze concepts of fairness and
solidarity among Spanish gypsies using a Strategy Method Ultimatum Game
and nd an unexpected high level of solidarity among them.
This paper intends to enlarge BCD previous research analyzing other possi-
ble factors explaining pro-social behavior, in particular we focus on inequality
aversion and its determinants.
A large body of experiments have shown that people do not choose system-
atically in order to maximize their own material payo¤s (see Henrich (2000) and
Henrich et al. (2001)). Recent literature on other regarding preferences tries
to explain individuals motivations for that behavior. Among these arguments,
inequality aversion appears as a key factor. Inequality aversion is dened as the
extent to which an individual prefers a more equal distribution of the money.
Ferh & Schmidt (1999) or Bolton & Ockenfels (2000), propose models in which
they introduce inequality aversion as an explaining factor of individualsbehav-
ior.
Experimental evidence is not conclusive about individuals inequality aver-
sion: while authors as Charness & Grosskopf (2005) show that inequality aver-
sion do not a¤ect individual behavior on strategic environments (even when
there is an advantage distribution for playerspartners), Loewenstein, Thomp-
son and Bazerman (1989) provide evidence on subjects exhibiting strong and
robust preferences against disadvantageous inequality.
The aim of this paper is to explore inequality aversion among a specic
population: Spanish gypsies. This paper also enlarges this research with the
analysis of the main items from the CORE1 questionnaire as determinants of
inequality aversion.
To perform the former investigation we conducted an economic experiment
plus an extensive survey among gypsies belonging to the school for adults El
Barro, placed in Vallecas, Madrid. The sample was composed by 38 subjects,
both females and males who came voluntarily to the experimental session.2 All
1CORE survey is an international project to analyze anthropology foundations for human
behavior. This survey contains three di¤erent experiments (ultimatum game, dictator game
and punishment game) plus an extensive questionnaire. The whole CORE protocol can be
consulted at http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/henrich/gameproject.htm .
2Recall that the experiment was conducted exclusively among gypsies, i.e., the whole sam-
ple was compounded of gypsies, so we did not study the behavior of gypsies facing non-gypsies.
This paper is only a rst approximation to gypsieseconomic behavior and we were interested
in analyze rst the pure level of inequality aversion without problems of racism or mistrust
which could appear when individuals play the game against other ethnic groups (see Ferraro
& Cummings (2005)). Hence, the study of inequality aversion when gypsies play the game vs.
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subjects were students from this school. They were illiterate and with very low
wealth. We used the CORE survey to explore demographic attitudes and social
capital issues. The survey comprises a large number of questions regarding
education, religiosity, family size, social integration, social capital and so on.
To elicit subjectsinequality aversion we used a modied version of the device
proposed by Kroll & Davidovitz (2003).
Results show that roughly 50% of the population are inequality averse. Re-
sults also indicate that inequality aversion is positively related to femininity,
number of children, churchgoing, family responsibility, family size, social inte-
gration and other social capital indicators; and negatively to age, education,
self-esteem and trust. Surprisingly, the current level of income has not a signif-
icant e¤ect.
The paper is structured as follows. Next section explains the mechanism
proposed by Kroll & Davidovitz (2003) to elicit inequality aversion. Section 3
analyzes the sample, the experimental protocol and the survey. Section 4 shows
results, and section ve concludes.
2 Kroll & Davidovitz (2003)
Kroll & Davidovitz (2003) (hereafter KD), propose an straight and simple
method to explore individual inequality aversion. The idea is that subjects
facing a decision problem show, by themselves, if they are or not inequality
averse.
In KD, subjects are asked to choose between two di¤erent lotteries featured
by: a) identical risk (both lotteries share the same level of risk) but b) heteroge-
neous distribution (they di¤er in the way the reward is distributed among the
whole population).
Kroll & Davidovitz imposed the same risk level to both procedures to elim-
inate risk aversion as a possible explanation for inequality aversion.3 The later
is easy to understand with an example.
Example: Imagine the life in a small village in the jungle where
the maintenance of individuals depends completely on the total bag
they hunt. Possibly, a subject prefers an egalitarian distribution of
the food not because he is inequality averse, but because he may expect
not to be able to hunt enough animals to feed his family.
The essence of the KD method is as follows. The individualspayo¤ depends
on the number shown by the dice thrown by the experimenter. Before the
experimenter throws the dice, subjects are o¤ered two possibilities:
non-gypsies is an open question to analyze.
3Risk aversion is dened as the desire to avoid uncertainty (Deardor¤ (2005)). In the
theory of expected utility maximization, a risk averter is dened as an individual with a
concave utility function (Friedman & Savage (1948)).
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Alternative 1 (common): the experimenter throws the dice once for the whole
population, so all individuals would receive the same payo¤ (depending
on the number shown by the dice).
Alternative 2 (individual): the experimenter throws the dice once for each
particular individual, therefore a subject would receive her reward accord-
ing to the number indicated on her dice.
Note that the probability of obtaining a specic amount of money (the risk of
the lottery) is the same in both methods (1/6 for each of the six di¤erent payo¤s).
Thus, the only di¤erence between these two possibilities is the distribution of
the money.
Applying alternative 1 all individuals obtain the same payo¤, whereas in
alternative 2 each participant gets his own payo¤ (which, particularly, could be
the same for all players). Hence, we may partition the population according to
the following two denitions:
Denition 1 (inequality averse) Subjects who choose alternative 1, given
that they prefer all individuals to obtain the same amount of money.
Denition 2 (inequality lover) Subjects who choose alternative 2 given that
they prefer each individual to obtain his own amount of money.
3 Experimental design, procedures and rewards
3.1 Design
We conducted this research following part of the CORE package included in
the CrossCultural Analysis Second phase (see Henrich and Ensminger (2002)).
We carried out the extensive survey, included in that package, plus two di¤erent
experiments: the Strategic Method Ultimatum Game (SMUG) and the Inequal-
ity Aversion Test (IAT) described above. SMUG was motivated with monetary
rewards while IAT was conducted hypothetically. Whereas BCD explores the
SMUG, this work focus on the inequality aversion test.4
As in KD, our subjects were invited to choose between a collective (but
uncertain) prize and a personal (but uncertain) one.
We will provide later (see table 1, page 13) the results and the main nd-
ings of the survey. They explore several individual attributes such us personal
features, labour issues, social integration and so forth.
3.2 Rewards
The IAT mechanism -which separates inequality aversion from risk aversion-
seems very intuitive and easy to understand, but the way of implementing the
4For a more detailed explanation of the whole experiment, including SMUG, see Brañas-
Garza et al. (2006).
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winningalternative is not at all obvious. The problem is that there are many
players choosing between the two alternatives explained before, hence, in order
to decide subjectsnal payo¤, we must implement only one of these alternatives.
The question is how to decide which alternative (1 or 2) will be executed. Some
options are:
Decision rule 1 (KD): common or individual dice would be determined by
the choice of the majority of the group.
The weakness of this method relies on the following fact. If subjects know
ex-ante that this would be the decision rule, the decisiveness ex-ante of each
individual is very small, therefore their decision will have a very low impact on
others income.5 In the case that subjects do not know the decision rule before
making their choice, this situation may generate deception.
Decision rule 2 (random): the alternative would be executed according to a
decision randomly chosen from the whole group of individuals.
However, this procedure would imply similar disadvantageous features as the
rule used by Kroll & Davidovitz. Firstly, the decisiveness ex ante of a subject
is only 1n , where n is the total number of individuals. In addition, this system
is too complicated in the sense that payo¤s are a composed lottery, hence the
execution of subjectsdecision depends too much on randomness.6
Decision rule 3: the alternative implemented is only decided according to the
preferences of one individual of the group. The di¤erence is that this indi-
vidual is not randomly chosen but chosen from an ordered list of the whole
group. Then, we repeat this procedure with the remainder subjects of the
list. Therefore, in each repetition one di¤erent subject is the dictatorin
the decision rule. This method avoids deception and also all individuals
are decisive in one repetition.
However, one of the inconveniences of this procedure would be the waste of
time (even if only one individual decides the alternative which implies throwing
one dice for each individual, the length of throwing a dice 2n   1 times would
be too long). Moreover, from the point of view of the aggregate payo¤s the
decision of one individual would not make a big change in others income.
5For a more detailed explanation about decisiveness, see Laurelle & Valenciano (2005).
They dened decisiveness ex-ante as the probability that a voter is successful and his vote
is critical for it. Individual i is said to have been successful if the nal decision coincides
with voter i´s vote. In particular, assuming that the distribution of vote conguration, S , is
uniform, that is p(S) =
1
2n
; the decisiveness ex-ante of any individual i in the majority rule
is
n  1
n
2
 
2n 1
: For instance, if n = 38 is decisiveness is 1:42 10 11:
6A lottery for the decision of the alternative of throwing the dice, and a lottery for the
nal payo¤ according to the number shown on the dice.
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Taking into account the di¢ culties to implement payo¤s and given that sub-
jects were already paid a show-up fee, and they also were paid for the SMUG
experiment, we considered that not to pay the subjects for the IAT would not
make an important di¤erence with respect to the incentives. Hence, we con-
ducted the IAT in an hypothetical scenario. As the SMUG was conducted
before the IAT, subjects were already involved in an economic setting and they
have incentives to perform the task seriously. Therefore, the results obtained
seem to be a good approach of their preferences concerning inequality.
3.3 Procedures
The whole experimental session was conducted in July 2004 in the School for
Adults El Barro in Vallecas. This school is driven by nuns with the target
of teaching illiteracy gypsies to read and to write. Experimental subjects live
in Santa Catalina, a slum outside Madrid. They were invited to participate
in an experiment in which they could earn some money. As a result of this
public callthe day of the experiment appeared 38 students. The later reduces
the representativeness of our sample; as subjects were students of a school for
adults, maybe they shared some special features and social norms that could
make them di¤erent from other gypsies, so we cannot generalize our results to
the whole gypsy population (although, as we will see below, our sample shares
the main social and cultural features with the rest of Spanish gypsy population).
The experimental session was conducted by three experimenters in three ba-
sic steps:7 i) all the subjects received the instructions orally in a common room;
they also received a numerical code (identication) for each one. Individuals
did not give their names, they were identied only with the numerical code.8
ii) Once subjects were completely informed about the experiment, they went
to another room where each experimenter conducted: 1) the SMUG (see BCD),
2) they ll the full CORE survey in a second room, and nally 3) the inequality
aversion device in the bottom of the second room.
iii) After subjects nished the SMUG, they received 3e showup fee, and
at the end they received the SMUG earning (5 euros on average).
4 Spanish gypsies
The Spanish gypsies come from the rst migratory waves of Roman into west-
ern Europe, which ended in the second half of the 15th century (see Gamella &
Martin (2002)). Spanish gypsies have contributed much to Spanish culture and
folklore, specially in Andalusia, where many of the symbols and practices which
identify the region to the world have a crucial gypsy component (see Leblon
7Six nuns helped the experimenters but they only participated in the questionnaire. They
did not know anything about the experiment (so they could not inuence subjectsresponses).
8 In this way we preserved anonymity of individuals, so results were not inuenced by
problems of identication between subjects. We expected sincere responses given that nobody
knew which were the responses of the rest of the individuals.
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(2003)). The number of gypsies in Spain is approximately 600,000. Spanish
gypsies live in permanent settled communities (almost all Spanish gypsies are
sedentary). They inhabit 95% of slums around large cities in Spain. Neighbor-
hoods are characterized by a lack of running water and a lack of police pres-
ence. However, levels of poverty and social discrimination are less signicative
for Spanish gypsies than for communities in Central and Eastern Europe.
Gypsy society as a whole is structured around extended family units. Indi-
viduals belong to a single unit. Gypsy society has no written rules. Instead, the
entire set of social norms is transmitted by observation and imitation (see Lancy
(1996)) or it can be transmitted orally from generation to generation. Thus the
older members play a key role in the society and are looked up to the whole
population who hold their experience and knowledge in high esteem. Related
to the size of the families, the average size of a Roman family is 5.4 members,
in comparison with 3.7 members of a non-Roman Spanish family.
Three basic social rules govern gypsy society: i) solidarity among gypsies
(which includes hospitality and aiding others), ii) freedom as a natural condition
of the people and iii) symbolism as a representative feature of gypsy culture.
This includes amenco, which is considered to be an expression of gypsy lifestyle.
Today the life and traditions of Spanish gypsies are being rapidly trans-
formed. These changes a¤ect di¤erently depending on the social status of the
individual, thus gypsy population is increasingly heterogeneous, even polarized,
between the new middle class and a gypsy underclass a¤ected by poverty and
social exclusion (see Gamella (2005)).
The literacy enrollment and school attendance rates are very low among Ro-
man. A very small percentage of Roman nish the basic education in Spain.
The labor market for Roman families is very di¤erent from the rest of popula-
tion. Jobs are low paid and there exist few hold salaried full-time jobs. Around
50-80% of gypsy population works in peddling, collecting solid urban waste and
performing personal work.
The points above are applicable to the entire population of gypsies living
in Spain. Next section explores our specic population, Spanish gypsies from
Vallecas. Results of the questionnaire show that this sample shares the main
socioeconomic features with the whole Spanish gypsy population.9
5 Descriptive analysis of our population
In this section we only focus on the most relevant items obtained from the
CORE questionnaire (related to socioeconomic and cultural features of this
specic sample) that we will use as explaining factors of inequality aversion.10
Table 1a and 1b show the items and summarize the main ndings for the 38
9See for instance Gamella (2005), Ringold et al. (2005), Martin & Gamella (2002) or
Gómez Alfaro (1998) among others.
10Although the whole CORE questionnaire contains a larger set of items to perform this
investigation we selected the most 40 relevant variables for urban population in Western
countries.
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subjects who attended the experiment (Nmeans number of observations). Table
1a shows the percentage of population which hold the selected characteristics
and table 1b shows the average of some numerical attributes.
Related to education features, 93% of population has some level of education,
this percentage seems very high, however they consider the fact of learning to
read and write as a high educational level achieved. In relation to personal
variables, tables 1a and 1b show that 73% of population is married, 86% of
population has children, and the mean number of children is almost 3.
insert Table 1a here
Also note that population is very poor, for instance only 1 up to 38 subjects
owns his house, none has lands only 1/3 of the population has swatch and 70%
of the population has not a car. Regarding the labor market status, 83% are
unemployed.
insert Table 1b here
Now we explore some of most representative variables which the CORE
protocol introduces: these variables refers to cooperation and social integration
(networking). As table 1a and 1b show, 15% of our population is a volunteer
in an association and 24% is associated to a club. The mean number of hours
spent in clubs is around 5 hours per week for people belonging to a club. The
mean number of hours dedicated to volunteer activities is about 1 hour in a
week.
Interestingly, the mean number of guests for lunch is around 6. The latter
feature jointly with the mean number of brothers (six, which is very high if we
compare to average number among Spaniards, 1.7) and the above variables that
indicate subjects cooperative behavior (club membership, voluntaryism...) may
be helpful to predict a sharingbehavior of the gypsy population.
6 Results
Before analyzing our results we will show some interesting arguments given by
our volunteers during the experimental session. We classify subjects according
to their level of inequality aversion.
i) On the one hand, 52.6% (20 of 38 subjects) preferred played their own
lottery, that is, they are inequality Lovers. From those individuals we may
extract the next sentences, that summarize the most usual responses:
 my fortune is mine.
 It is better if each one play his own lottery.
 it wouldnt be fair if just because shes unlucky the rest of us have to be
unlucky too.
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ii) On the other hand, 47.4% (18 of 38 subjects) preferred played the same
lottery for all individuals, that is, they are inequality Averse. From this
population we show the most usual explanations:
 It is better if all of us get the same.
 it is better if all of us get the same, because we avoid problems; if anybody
earn more money other subjects may feel o¤ended.
Next part of this section deeply examines the connection between inequality
aversion and the features of the population extracted from our survey, that is,
the relationship between inequality aversion and the variables obtained through
the CORE questionnaire.
Table 2 shows the results for a logit model, where the dependent variable is
inequality aversion (which is a binary variable which takes value 1 for inequality
aversion).
insert Table 2 here
Now, we summarize the most striking results. One overwhelming result is the
gender bias for this sample: females are more averse than males. Interestingly,
older individuals are less averse than youngest which means that aversion is
decreasing in age.
Other items related to subjectspersonal features are also interesting: Mari-
tal status plays a relevant role on aversion, subjects with spouse are more averse.
The number of children is also a positive determinant of aversion and similarly
the number of individuals living in the same house is also positive. In the same
direction, individuals who are family heads are more inequality averse. However,
the number of brothers is not statistically signicant (note that the number of
brothers does not depend on the subject, so it does not increase his sense of
responsibility). This set of variables reects that the larger responsibility the
larger inequality aversion. This result seems to be quite sensible!
A surprising result is that individual wealth does not play any role on subject
inequality aversion. This can be due to the fact that the di¤erences in wealth
among subjects are negligible.
Individual training (education) a¤ects aversion in an amazing way: individ-
uals schooling decreases inequality aversion, probably because subjects endowed
with more education are more competitive.
Another surprise is that religion per se does not a¤ect, i.e. is not statis-
tically signicant, whereas church assistance a¤ects. In fact, subjects church-
attendance increases their aversion level.
The sense of safety and trust decrease aversion.
Regarding subjects social integration we extract some notable estimations.
The number of guests invited for lunch increases aversion. Although its e¤ect
is slight we may explain this result directly: more averse subjects are willing to
invite more people to their home. In the same way, individuals who are club
memberships are more averse. However there is not inequality aversion behind
subjects participation as volunteers in some activities.
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7 Concluding remarks
This paper analyzes the determinants of inequality aversion among Spanish
gypsies in Vallecas. In particular, this work studies the relationship between
inequality aversion and the most relevant items from the CORE questionnaire,
using a logit specication.
First of all, using a procedure similar to that developed by Kroll & Davidovitz
we extract that roughly half of the population participating in the experiment
is inequality averse. In order to investigate the observed behavior, we base
our analysis in the particular features (obtained through a questionnaire) of
this population , many of them are shared by other gypsy populations (see for
example Gamella (2005)).
Results of the logit model show that gender and age a¤ect inequality aver-
sion. In particular females and younger individuals are more egalitarian. Family
responsibilities (position, number of children and so on) also a¤ects positively
inequality aversion. Education makes not more egalitarian individuals, this may
be due to a competitive environment in the school. Religion has also a posi-
tive inuence on egalitarianism but only for those who practice it regularly.
Logically, social integration a¤ects positively inequality aversion.
Finally, observe that these results cannot be extrapolated to all gypsy pop-
ulations in the world. However, as we have shown in section 4, Spanish gypsy
population shares the most relevant sociocultural features of our experimental
population, so results could be generalized to the Spanish gypsy population.
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Table 1a: Some Population Features I
Attribute % n Attribute % n
PERSONAL EDUCATION
female 68 38 some level of education 93 37
is married 73 37 goes to school 65 38
lives with his partner 67 33 WEALTH
has children 86 35 house ownership 3 34
was born in Madrid 63 38 has not swatch 64 38
was born in a rural village 18 33 not satellite television 87 38
is family head 54 35 has not radio 24 38
SOCIAL CAPITAL has not car 70 38
houses with only one food 16 38 has lands 0 38
houses with guests 54 37 is unemployed 83 23
is associated to a club 24 34 OTHER
is volunteer 15 33 gypsy boss 0 4
does not trust in people 56 36 thinks they live in a safe home 74 38
RELIGION
goes to church 59 29
has religion 75 36
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Table 1b: Some Population Features II
Attribute Mean n Attribute Mean n
PERSONAL EDUCATION
age 28.79 37 years of schooling 3.6 25
number of children 2.57 30 JOB
number of brothers 6 38 hours worked/week 24.6 10
position among brothers 3.84 38 gypsy colleg./job 15.3 3
RELIGION SOCIAL CAPITAL
churchatt. days/month 21.61 18 people living in a house 4.76 38
guests for lunch/day 5.73 22
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Table 2: Results for logit regression
variable parameter standard error
constant -0.51* 0.18
male -0.18* 0.05
age -0.02* 0.00
school assistance -0.49* 0.06
wealth -0.01 0.03
religion -0.05 0.04
church assistance 0.36* 0.06
married 0.18* 0.05
children -0.55* 0.06
no of children 0.25* 0.04
brothers -0.01* 0.00
family head 0.48* 0.05
size of family 0.09* 0.01
only one food 0.31* 0.04
guests for lunch 0.01* 0.00
sense of safety -0.09* 0.05
club membership 0.36* 0.07
volunteer 0.09 0.09
trust -0.23* 0.01
 0.23* 0.01
*signicative at 1% level.
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